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Abstract
This paper describes a model-checking based methodology to detect systematic errors commonly made by
non-expert users. The human and computer components of the systems are modelled separately. The
human component consists of a general model of the user’s cognitively plausible behaviour, which can be
then reﬁned into speciﬁc instances of behaviour that reﬂect relevant aspects of users’ personalities and skills.
We consider, as a case study, a formal model of an online interactive tool that enables conference attendees
to share thoughts and reactions and select matching attendees to start communication with. Starting from
the initial system design, a model-checking technique is used to highlight system vulnerabilities that arise
from interactions with non-expert users and may lead to security violations. The results of the analysis are
exploited to improve the design by introducing safeguards that reduce or even prevent security violations.
Keywords: formal veriﬁcation, human behaviour, usability, user error, social computing, process calculi,
model-checking.
1 Introduction
The widespread use of computers in safety-critical and security systems increases
the need for human-computer interaction to be designed in a way that reduces the
likelihood of human errors.
Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) techniques, which mostly emerged in the
1980’s, have been widely used in the analysis of safety-critical systems but have
shown little success when applied to the safety assessment of user interface design
[11]. In the 1990’s increasing use of formal methods has yielded more objective
analysis techniques [6], which, however, mainly addressed safety-critical aspects of
Interactive Systems (IS) where the human component is represented by operators
with expected expertise and skills. Moreover, the operator behaviour was often
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modelled as deﬁned by the interface requirements. In reality, however, the user
interacting with the system does not necessarily behave as it was expected while
designing the interface, and errors are actually the very result of an unexpected user
behaviour that emerge through the interaction. To best capture such an emergent
behaviour, a model of the operator must specify the cognitively plausible behaviour,
that is all the possible behaviours that can occur, and that involve diﬀerent cognitive
processes [1]. The model must take into account all relationships between user’s
actions, user’s goals and the environment.
A number of researchers have explored the use of formal models to understand
how cognitive errors can aﬀect user performance. Rushby [12] models the behaviour
of a forgetful operator who follows a warning display light or a non-forgetful operator
without warning lights and checks for an emergent mode confusion. Curzon and
Blandford [5] focus on goal-based interactions and model the behaviour of a user
who assumes all tasks completed when the goal is achieved, but forgets to complete
some important subsidiary tasks (post-completion error).
In this paper we focus on IS intended for use among large groups of people,
with communication, collaboration, information exchange and interest matching
as the main goals [8,9]. In such a context there is no concern about safety, but
the system must be easy to use regarding learnability and eﬃciency as well as
guarantee conﬁdentiality and other security properties, as required by legal and
community policies. The complexity of the interface should be acceptable for any
level of user’s skill, and the system should not discourage users with its deﬁcient
or inconvenient operability. Moreover, there is little a priori knowledge about the
user’s behaviour and experience in using the system, and about more general user’s
skills in dealing with computers and the Internet. It is important, therefore, to set
the most pessimistic scenario, in which the user is non-expert, with minimal skills,
and to explore alternative user behaviours corresponding to a variety of attitudes
and personalities. Mode confusion and post-completion errors must be considered
very likely to occur. On the other hand, the system must be designed to guide
user’s actions and decisions by oﬀering appropriate options in stages of interaction.
We use modelling techniques developed in previous work [2], which are based
on the CSP process algebra [10] and on temporal logic, ﬁrst to deﬁne the user’s
goals and the interface as separate processes, and then to compose such processes
in parallel and analyse the emergent interaction, looking for security vulnerabilities.
Analysis is carried out by speciﬁying the properties in temporal logic and using the
Concurrency Workbench of the New Century (CWB–NC) [4] model-checker to verify
properties against the model. We illustrate the approach on a simple case study
based on a web-based online interactive tool that enables conference attendees to
communicate and share their thoughts and reactions to a shared event [7].
Section 2 introduces a scenario that may occur during a workshop or conference,
in which conference attendees share thoughts and opinions through a web interface
motivated by various goals (Section 2.1). We also assume a basic structure of the
web interface accessible through a login mechanism (Section 2.2).
Section 3 brieﬂy introduces the CSP notation used throughout the paper and
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describes the model of the user behaviour in terms of three possible goals that may
motivate and lead the user in interacting with the system: expressing own ideas
in the forum (Section 3.1), establishing contact with a matching user (Section 3.2)
and gathering information about other users (Section 3.3).
Section 4 presents an initial design of the system as the parallel composition of
two CSP processes (Section 4.3), one modelling the user privileges (Section 4.1) and
the other modelling the web pages (Section 4.2).
Section 5 identiﬁes possible security threats (Section 5.1), deﬁnes a security prop-
erty which aims to prevent security violations (Section 5.2), introduces assumptions
on the expertise and forgetfulness of a typical user (Section 5.3), shows how to
analyse the system design under the given assumptions with respect to the security
property (Section 5.4), and describes possible improvements of the design to reduce
(Section 5.5), or even completely overcome (Section 5.6), the vulnerabilities of the
initial design.
2 Case Study: A Conference System
This tool consists of a web-based interface which could be a part of a bigger system,
that features a simple discussion forum and a member list. Through web pages
users gather information on a conference (or some other events) and ﬁnd/contact
other users who are likely to match their interests. The tool, however, does not
feature a dating service [9]. Matching decisions are instead explicitly made by the
user.
2.1 Scenario
We start considering a common scenario that may occur at a workshop or conference.
We use the word user to identify the main subject of our scenario. After a lecture or
speech a user would like to meet other attendees to discuss impressions or reactions
to the attended presentation. Such attendees might either be working on similar
projects as our user or have similar thoughts about the topic of the presentation. A
lecture usually involves a large number of attendees and every single attendee could
have a diﬀerent opinion about the topic. In series of lectures attendees do not have
many chances to communicate with one another and ask opinions. Therefore it is
important to allow the user to search and initiate communications before attending
the conference and in order to make in advance plans and appointments for meetings
to be held while being at the conference.
A conference has a website dedicated to sharing and discussing ideas and re-
ﬂections about talks and seminars. On such a website users can set up their own
proﬁles and browse other users’ proﬁles in order to decide whether to contact them.
The purpose of the system is to help people to meet and share their opinions and
reactions to lectures or other events that will be (or were) held during the confer-
ence.
The conference web site contains all information about the conference, including
lists of lectures and events. We assume that users have already started sharing their
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thoughts and opinions well before the beginning of the conference. In a typical
situation, the user accesses the web site and scans through the lists of events and
lectures, and reads the lecture notes and abstracts of papers and presentations.
After logging in the user can set up a proﬁle, which includes the choice of some
keywords to represent the user’s professional and research interests as well as ideas
and thoughts. The user can also:
read messages posted by other users to get a general view of other people’s re-
action to a recent event/presentation as well as to look for users with matching
thoughts and opinions;
post messages to share thoughts and opinions on a recent event/presentation;
reply to messages posted by other users to support or try to confute their thoughts
and opinions;
read proﬁles of other users to understand whether they have matching interests,
ideas and thoughts;
contact users who are believed to represent good matches;
logout from the system.
We assume that every post and reply has a link where all related posts and replies
are listed.
The user may have diﬀerent motivations to use the conference system. These
motivations, in general, depend on the user’s personality, social skills, familiarity
with the topics, research and professional interests, as well as practical issues such
as availability of time.
Motivations determine the users’ goals in using the conference system. Depend-
ing on the speciﬁc goals, the user may exploit diﬀerent services provided by the
system. In this paper we analyse the behaviour of the user in relation to three
speciﬁc goals:
gathering information by just browsing through posted messages and user pro-
ﬁles;
establishing contacts with users who represent good matches;
expressing ideas by just posting messages and replying to messages (after reading
them).
2.2 Web Interface
The informal description of the user’s interaction with the system presented in
Section 2.1 highlights three basic user statuses:
• the user has not logged in;
• the user has logged in, but has not set up a proﬁle;
• the user has set up a proﬁle.
We assume that
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(1) only logged-in users can set up their proﬁles and read a user proﬁle and a
message;
(2) only users who have set up a proﬁle can post or reply to a message and contact
other users.
Therefore, the user status changes when the user logs in, sets up a proﬁle and logs
out.
The system interface consists of three main web pages
• a Home page to set up the user proﬁle and browse general information about
the conference;
• a page to browse User Proﬁles set up by other users;
• a Forum page to post own messages and browse messages posted by other users;
which are linked to two additional pages. The User Proﬁles page is linked to
• the Proﬁle page that allows the user to view and analyse a speciﬁc proﬁle and,
when a matching is found, contact the corresponding user.
The Forum page is linked to
• the Message page that allows the user to read a specifc message and, if this is
found interesting, to reply to it.
These two additional pages are mutually linked because every message has an author
who must have set up a proﬁle, due to assumption (2) above. Therefore, messages
are linked to the author’s proﬁle. Similarly, a proﬁle may be linked to message(s),
if the corresponding user has already posted (or replied to) any.
3 Modelling User Behaviour
The notation that we are going to use throughout the paper is based upon Hoare’s
CSP notation for describing Communicating Sequential Processes [10]. We use the
CWB–NC [4] syntax for CSP:
• “a -> X” means that action a occurs and then process X starts;
• “X [] Y” is the choice between processes X and Y;
• “X [| S |] Y” is the parallel composition of processes X and Y with synchroni-
sation set S.
The synchronisation set deﬁnes the set of actions that must synchronise within the
parallel composition.
Our model of the user behaviour focusses on the three user goals introduced
in Section 2.1. The speciﬁc goal the user has in mind will drive the choice of the
appropriate actions, among those allowed by the web interface. For example, if
the goal is gathering information, the user will just need to browse through posted
messages and other user proﬁles, whereas if the goal is establishing contacts, the
user will eventually need to explicitly contact another user. To achieve any goal
the user always needs to login in the system (assumption (1) in Section 2.2). This
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ensures that only authorised users may enter the system initially.
proc User = ( login -> AuthorisedUser ) [] UnauthorisedUser
proc AuthorisedUser = goal -> ( ( gather_info -> GatherInfo )
[] ( establish_contact -> EstablishContact )
[] ( express_ideas -> ExpressIdeas ) )
After achieving the goal, the authorised user can either logout or choose a new
goal and continue the interaction session with the system. In principle, a cognitively
plausible behaviour [1] must include the situation in which the user may leave the
interaction session unattended at any time, independently of whether the goal is
achieved or not. However, such a situation is unlikely to occur when the user focusses
on achieving the goal, but it is much more plausible after the goal is achieved. It
is actually common that the user assumes all tasks completed when the goal is
achieved, but forgets to complete some important subsidiary tasks (post-completion
error) [5], such as logging out of the system. Therefore we assume that
(3) the user will not logout and will not leave the interaction session unattended
while trying to achieve a goal, unless failing to perform an action needed to
achieve the goal;
(4) after achieving the goal, the user may forget to logout and leave the interaction
session unattended.
proc GoalAchieved = AuthorisedUser [] Leave
proc Leave = unattended -> ( ( short_delay -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( long_delay -> UnauthorisedUser ) )
[] ( logout -> User )
proc UnauthorisedUser = ( try_setup -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( try_contact -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( try_reply -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( try_post_a_message -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( try_read_a_profile -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( success -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( failure -> UnauthorisedUser )
[] ( logout -> User)
After achieving the goal, the authorised user may pursue a new goal (state
AuthorisedUser) or leave the session (state Leave). In the latter case, the user may
either logout (action logout) or leave the session unattended (action unattended)
without logging-out. An unattended open session, after a certain time, which may
be short (action short_delay) or long (action long_delay), may be taken over by
an unauthorised user (in state UnauthorisedUser), who can try to perform any
action.
Note that an (authorised or unauthorised) user may just try to perform the
intended action; whether such an action will succeed (action success) or fail (action
failure) depends on the system with which the user interacts.
3.1 Expressing Ideas
Posting messages in the forum and replying to already posted messages are ways of
expressing one’s ideas.
In general, the goal can be achieved (action goal_achieved) by either posting
a message (action try_post_a_message followed by success) or replying (action
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try_reply followed by success) to a message, possibly after reading such mes-
sage (action try_read_a_message followed by success). Due to assumption (2) in
Section 2.2 action try_setup may also need to be performed.
Note that, in general, even if we assume that the user has the intention to read a
message before replying to it, we cannot assume that such intention will be always
implemented in the right sequence of actions. It may happen that the user reads
several messages before replying to any of them and then, intending to reply to
some of them, may erroneuosly reply to a message which was not previously read.
proc ExpressIdeas = ( try_setup -> success -> ExpressIdeas
[] failure -> ( ExpressIdeas [] Leave ) )
[] ( try_post_a_message -> ( success -> goal_achieved -> GoalAchieved
[] failure -> ( ExpressIdeas [] Leave ) ) )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> ( success -> ExpressIdeas
[] failure -> ( ExpressIdeas [] Leave ) ) )
[] ( try_reply -> ( success -> goal_achieved -> GoalAchieved )
[] failure -> ( ExpressIdeas [] Leave ) )
At any stage of the interaction, the user may fail (action failure) to perform an
action. There are four possible ways in which the user may react to such a failure:
(i) try to repeat the failed action (remaining in state ExpressIdeas and repeating
the same action);
(ii) try an alternative action (remaining in state ExpressIdeas and performing a
diﬀerent action);
(iii) leave the interaction session unattended (moving to state Leave and performing
unattended);
(iv) log out from the system (moving to state Leave and performing logout).
In general the choice of reaction depends on the user’s personality and familiarity
with computer systems, as well as time availability.
3.2 Establishing contacts
In order to establish contact with a matching user it is necessary to explicitly contact
that user. In general, the user who wishes to establish contact may have already
collected outside the system all necessary information to select a matching user and
use the system just to contact such a matching user.
proc EstablishContact = ( try_setup -> ( success -> EstablishContact
[] failure -> ( EstablishContact [] Leave ) ) )
[] ( try_read_a_profile -> ( success -> EstablishContact
[] failure -> ( EstablishContact [] Leave ) ) )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> ( success -> EstablishContact
[] failure -> ( EstablishContact [] Leave ) ) )
[] ( try_contact -> ( success -> goal_achieved -> GoalAchieved
[] failure -> ( EstablishContact [] Leave ) ) )
There are two ways for gathering information to help select a matching user:
reading other user’s proﬁles (action try_read_a_profile) and reading messages
(action try_read_a_message). The user who wishes to establish contact will keep
reading proﬁles and messages (remaining in state EstablishContact) until a match-
ing user is found, before trying to contact such a matching user (action try_contact).
However, action try_contactmay be immediately performed without any iteration
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of the information gathering loop, if the information gathering process has been
performed outside the system. Obviously, the goal_achieved action must be pre-
ceeded by the try_contact action. Due to assumption (2) in Section 2.2 action
try_setup may also need to be performed.
As for the previous goal, at any stage of the interaction, the user may succeed
or fail in performing an action.
3.3 Gathering Information
Gathering information about other users may not only be a means to select a match-
ing user but also be the ﬁnal goal to achieve. If gathering information is the actual
user’s goal, then each of the try_read_a_profile and try_read_a_message actions
may either be an iteration of the information gathering loop (in state GatherInfo)
or lead to the goal_achieved action, which is performed when the user has collected
all needed information.
proc GatherInfo = ( try_read_a_profile -> ( success -> ( GatherInfo
[] goal_achieved -> GoalAchieved )
[] failure -> ( GatherInfo [] Leave ) ) )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> ( success -> ( GatherInfo
[] goal_achieved -> GoalAchieved )
[] failure -> ( GatherInfo [] Leave ) ) )
4 Initial System Design
4.1 Model of User Privileges
The three basic user statuses highlighted in Section 2.2 can be formalised by three
CSP processes as follows.
proc Priviliges = ( login -> (( noprofile -> enter -> NonMember )
[] ( profile -> enter -> Member ) ) )
proc NonMember = ( try_setup -> success -> Member )
[] ( logout -> Priviliges )
[] ( try_read_a_profile -> NonMember )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> NonMember )
[] ( success -> NonMember )
proc Member = ( try_read_a_profile -> Member )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> Member )
[] ( try_post_a_message -> Member )
[] ( try_reply -> Member )
[] ( try_contact -> Member )
[] ( logout -> Priviliges )
[] ( success -> Member )
Process Priviliges deﬁnes the initial state, in which the user has not logged
in yet. After the user logs in (action login), the system checks whether the user
has already set a proﬁle (action profile) or not (action noprofile). If the user
has not set a proﬁle yet, the state changes to NonMember, otherwise it changes
to Member. These two states deﬁne the two user privileges that correspond to
assumptions (1) and (2) in Section 2.2. The purpose of action enter is to move to
the state corresponding to the appropriate user privilege and to activate the web
interface described in Section 4.2. User privileges can be changed by the successful
execution of action try_setup (from NonMember to Member). Action logout leads
back to the initial state (Priviliges).
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Note that setting up a proﬁle is necessary to achieve the expressing ideas and
establishing contacts goals, but not to achive the gathering information goal.
4.2 Model of the Web Interface
The model of the web interface consists of six states.
proc Interface1 = ( enter -> Home1 )
proc Home1 = ( users -> UserProfiles1 )
[] ( forum -> Forum1 )
[] ( try_setup -> success -> Home1 )
[] ( logout -> Interface1 )
proc UserProfiles1 = ( forum -> Forum1 )
[] ( try_read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile1 )
[] ( home -> Home1 )
proc AProfile1 = ( back_to_users -> UserProfiles1 )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> success -> AMessage1 )
[] ( try_contact -> success -> AProfile1 )
proc Forum1 = ( try_read_a_message -> success -> AMessage1 )
[] ( users -> UserProfiles1 )
[] ( try_post_a_message -> success -> Forum1 )
[] ( home -> Home1 )
proc AMessage1 = ( try_read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile1 )
[] ( back_to_forum -> Forum1 )
[] ( try_reply -> success -> AMessage1 )
In the initial state (Interface1) the home page of the web interface is acti-
vated by action enter (and the subsequent change to state Home1), which ends the
procedure to check the user privileges described in Section 4.1.
The other states model the ﬁve web pages described in Section 2.2. Actions
users, forum, home, back_to_users and back_to_forum allow the user to freely
navigate through the ﬁve web pages. Note that action logout is only possible from
state Home1. This means that the user has always to go back to the home page in
order to be able to logout.
Since logout and navigation are determined by just clicking on buttons, we
implicitly assume that the user will never fail to perform such actions. Therefore, we
do not need to express logout and pure navigation actions as attempts (by preﬁxing
their names with “try_”), neither to associate them with success or failure actions.
4.3 Overall System Model
The overall system is expressed by process SYSTEM1 given by the parallel composition
of the user privileges (initially in state Priviliges), the web interface (initially in
state Interface1) and the user (process User)
proc SYSTEM1 = ( ( Priviliges [| {enter, try_read_a_profile, try_read_a_message,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, try_contact, try_setup, success, logout} |] Interface1 )
[| {login, try_setup, try_read_a_message, try_read_a_profile, try_contact,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, logout, success, failure} |] User )
The Priviliges and Interface1 processes must synchronise on all actions that
can be eventually performed by the Priviliges process apart from the profile
and noprofile, which deﬁne the checking procedure modelled by the Priviliges
process (they are internal actions of Priviliges).
The process originated by the parallel composition of processes Priviliges and
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Interface1 is then composed with the User process. In this second parallel com-
position, the synchronisation must include all user actions that deﬁne interactions
with the interface. Note that we have also included the failure action, which
does not occur in the Priviliges and Interface1 processes (and therefore neither
in their parallel composition) in the sychronisation set. This prevents the overall
system from performing the failure action, so modelling the following assumption
(5) the user never fails to perform an intended action that is immediately available
on the current web page.
Such an assumption was implicitly made for logout and navigation actions in Sec-
tion 4.2; it is here explicitly extended to all user actions. The purpose of this
assumption is to show that the design weaknesses captured by the model-checking
analysis presented in Section 5.4 are independent of the ability of the user in suc-
cessfully performing a single interaction with the interface.
5 Improving the System Design
In this section we use the CWB–NC to analyse the interaction between the user
behaviour model deﬁned in Section 3 and various versions of the web interface
deﬁned in Section 4. The analysis of the original web interface deﬁned in Section 4
highlights security vulnerabilities, which are then partly or entirely overcome in the
next versions.
5.1 Security Threats and Safeguards
According to assumptions (3) and (4) in Section 3 the user will not logout and
will not leave the interface unattended before achieving the goal, unless failing to
perform an action needed to achieve the goal. However, after achieving the goal, the
user may forget to logout and leave the interface unattended without coming back
to use it. Such a situation may lead to security violations. The interface is supposed
to be designed with the aim to minimise the likelihood that an unattended session
is exploited by a non-authorised user to access proﬁles (conﬁdentiality violation) or
to pretend to be the logged-in user (masquerading).
Ideally, we would like an unattended session to automatically logout on time to
prevent security violations. However, in practice, we can just introduce safeguards
that minimise the likelihood of security violations, in a way that does not introduce
much degradation in the quality and performance of the services provided to the
user. In order to ﬁnd the right balance between security and the quality and per-
formance of services, it is important to analyse the user attitudes and behaviours
while interacting with the system. Speciﬁc attitudes and behaviours may actually
reduce the likelihood of some threats and increase the likelihood of others. For
example, panicking when the planned action does not appear immediately available
on the current web page is an attitude that may lead to the behaviour of leaving the
session unattended, so causing a security threat. On the other hand, the attitude of
always checking that all tasks have been completed after achieving a goal reduces
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the likelihood of forgetting to logout before leaving the session.
It is therefore sensible to introduce safeguards only to prevent the most likely
threats, that is, those threats that are more likely to occur given speciﬁc assumptions
about user attitudes and behaviours.
5.2 Security Properties
An important requirement that our system should meet is that an open session is
never left unattended. Meeting such a requirement would deﬁnitely prevent security
violation from occurring.
However, it would be useless to state a property that heavily depends on the
user’s limitations, in terms of memory, attention, etc., and can be only partly af-
fected by the way the interface constrains the user behaviour. Assuming that the ses-
sion can actually be left unattended in the way expressed by assumptions (3) and (4)
in Section 3, we have to ensure that no unauthorised user is able to exploit the situa-
tion by performing actions (in state UnauthorisedUser) that may generate security
violations. In particular, we would like to ensure that an unauthorised user cannot
access other users’ proﬁles and messages (conﬁdentiality violation), by successfully
performing actions in
C = {try_read_a_profile, try_read_a_message},
or pretend to be the logged-in user (masquerading) by successfully performing ac-
tions in
M = {try_setup, try_post_a_message, try_reply, try_contact}.
Set S = C ∪M consists of exactly all actions that may lead to security violations.
According to assumptions (3), (4) and (5), a session can only be left unattended
after achieving the goal. Since our model implicitly assumes that goals are de-
termined only by authorised users, the critical time interval during which security
violations may occur starts at the goal_achieved action and terminates at action
goal, when the next goal is determined by an authorised user, or at action logout.
In fact, determining a new goal cannot occur in the UnauthorisedUser state, and
action logout exits the UnauthorisedUser state.
Using CWB–NC syntax [4], a property asserting that no security violation may
occur between the achievement of the goal and the next logout or determined goal
can be formalised as follows.
prop secure = ( A G ( {goal_achieved} -> ( {-success} W {goal,logout} ) ) )
In CWB-NC syntax atomic formulae have form {action list} or {-action list};
the former is satisﬁed by any action that appears in action list, whereas the latter
is satiﬁed by any action that does not appear in action list. Note that a deadlock
process satisﬁes ~{action list}, where ~ is the negation connective, but does not
satisfy {-action list}. The W temporal operator (weak until) ensures that formula
pWq is true if and only if p is continuously true forever or until q is true.
Property security prevents action success from occuring between achieving
a goal and pursuing a new goal or logging-out, that is, it prevents any action in
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S from being successfully performed between achieving a goal and pursuing a new
goal or logging-out. Therefore property security guarantees that
• the authorised user will always be able to logout or set a new goal;
• if the session is left unattended (action unattended) after achieving a goal (action
goal_achieved), then no unauthorised user who may take over the session can
successfully perform actions in S.
Note that using {-success} rather than ~{success} in formula secure ensures that
a deadlock occurring after the goal is achieved falsiﬁes the secure formula. We will
exploit this in Section 5.3 by checking whether some constrained user behaviours
are supported by the interface.
5.3 Constraining the User Behaviour
The users of our system are not supposed to be expert in using interactive systems.
In fact, some of them might have very low familiarity with computers. The user
behavior model deﬁned in section 3 is a very general one and needs to be restricted
to capture speciﬁc attitudes and behaviours of non-expert users.
A typical behaviour of a non-expert user after achieving a goal is to look for a
way to logout but, if no way is found after a reasonable time, to eventually leave
the session unattended. Such a behaviour may be enforced by a process deﬁned as
follows.
proc NonExpert = ( goal -> NonExpert )
[] ( home -> NonExpert )
[] ( users -> NonExpert )
[] ( forum -> NonExpert )
[] ( back_to_users -> NonExpert )
[] ( back_to_forum -> NonExpert )
[] ( unattended -> NonExpert )
[] ( logout -> NonExpert )
[] ( goal_achieved -> Finished)
proc Finished = ( logout -> NonExpert )
[] ( unattended -> NonExpert )
This process has then to be composed in parallel with the system as follows.
proc SYSTEM1N = ( SYSTEM1 [| {goal, home, users, forum, back_to_users, back_to_forum,
unattended, logout, goal_achieved} |] NonExpert )
Apart from unattended and logout, any other action on which the two processes
synchronise cannot occur after the goal_achieved action, consistently with the
behaviour of a non-expert user described above.
The user deﬁned by the SYSTEM1N process may, however, forget to logout and
leave the session unattended even if there is a logout mechanism (e.g. a logout
button) promptly available on the current web page. This occurs when actions
unattended and logout are both available but unattended is chosen. We model
an extreme case of a non-forgetful user, who will always choose a logout action
when available after goal_achieved, even when intending afterwards to pursue
another goal, and will never leave the session unattended. Such a non-forgetful user
may be deﬁned by appropriately synchronising the system with the NonForgetful
process deﬁned as follows.
proc NonForgetful = ( goal_achieved -> logout -> NonForgetful )
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[] ( goal -> NonForgetful )
[] ( logout -> NonForgetful )
The appropriate synchronisation is achieved by composing this process, which
works as a constraint, in parallel with SYSTEM1N as follows.
proc SYSTEM1NR = ( SYSTEM1N [| {goal_achieved, unattended, logout, goal} |] NonForgetful )
Since the two components must also synchronise on unattended, and this does
not occur in the behaviour of the NonForgetful process, the unattended action
can never occur in the composite process. Note that this would cause a deadlock
when composing the NonForgetful constraint with a system that does not allow
action logout to be performed immediately after goal_achieved.
5.4 Analysis of the Initial Design
Using the CWB–NC we can verify that security does not hold for the SYSTEM1NR
system. The system appears to be unsecure in spite of having introduced a con-
straint to ensure that the user will always remember to logout before terminating
the interaction with the system. Constraints NonForgetful and NonExpert allow
only action logout to be performed immediately after goal_achieved, but logout
is only available in state Home1 of process Interface1, which cannot be the state
in which Interface1 is immediately after goal_achieved is performed. This cause
a deadlock immediately after goal_achieved, which falsiﬁes security.
The fact that security does not hold for the SYSTEM1NR system, in which the
non-expert user is constrained to immediately logout, shows that the security vul-
nerability cannot be due to the forgetfulness of the user and the web interface needs
to be improved to address non-expert users.
The problem is that the logout is not available on each web page, but just on
the Home page. The users have to properly navigate back to the Home page from
the page where the goal has been achieved. This might be quite challenging for
a non-expert user. In addition, the presence of a logout button on each web page
would be a reminder for the user to logout, so addressing also expert but forgetful
users.
We therefore modify the interface by introducing a logout action in every state
as follows.
proc Interface2 = ( enter -> Home2 )
proc Home2 = ( users -> UserProfiles2 )
[] ( forum -> Forum2 )
[] ( try_setup -> success -> Home2 )
[] ( logout -> Interface2 )
proc UserProfiles2 = ( forum -> Forum2 )
[] ( try_read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile2 )
[] ( home -> Home2 )
[] ( logout -> Interface2 )
proc AProfile2 = ( back_to_users -> UserProfiles2 )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> success -> AMessage2 )
[] ( try_contact -> success -> AProfile2 )
[] ( logout -> Interface2 )
proc Forum2 = ( try_read_a_message -> success -> AMessage2 )
[] ( users -> UserProfiles2 )
[] ( try_post_a_message -> success -> Forum2 )
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[] ( home -> Home2 )
[] ( logout -> Interface2 )
proc AMessage2 = ( try_read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile2 )
[] ( back_to_forum -> Forum2 )
[] ( try_reply -> success -> AMessage2 )
[] ( logout -> Interface2 )
The processes that deﬁne the composite system are then deﬁned as follows.
proc SYSTEM2 = ( ( Priviliges [| {enter, try_read_a_profile, try_read_a_message,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, try_contact, try_setup, success, logout} |] Interface2)
[| {login, try_setup, try_read_a_message, try_read_a_profile, try_contact,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, logout, success, failure} |] User)
proc SYSTEM2N = ( SYSTEM2 [| {goal, home, users, forum, back_to_users, back_to_forum,
unattended, logout, goal_achieved} |] NonExpert )
proc SYSTEM2NR = ( SYSTEM2N [| {goal_achieved, unattended, logout, goal} |] NonForgetful )
We can now verify, using the CWB–NC, that security holds for the SYSTEM2NR
system.
5.5 Introducing a timeout
A problem with the interface deﬁned by SYSTEM2 is the lack of any protection for
forgetful users. Although adding a direct logout mechanism to each web page may
work as a reminder to the user to logout, users might still forget to logout. Property
security does not actually hold for SYSTEM2N.
A way of improving the situation is the introduction of a timeout in the interface
to force the system to automatically logout if there is no action by the on-line user,
within a given time. We modify the interface as follows
proc Interface3 = ( enter -> Home3 )
proc Home3 = ( users -> UserProfiles3 )
[] ( forum -> Forum3 )
[] ( try_setup -> success -> Home3 )
[] ( logout -> Interface3 )
[] ( short_delay -> Home3 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface3 )
proc UserProfiles3 = ( forum -> Forum3 )
[] ( try_read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile3 )
[] ( home -> Home3 )
[] ( logout -> Interface3 )
[] ( short_delay -> UserProfiles3 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface3 )
proc AProfile3 = ( back_to_users -> UserProfiles3 )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> success -> AMessage3 )
[] ( try_contact -> success -> AProfile3 )
[] ( logout -> Interface3 )
[] ( short_delay -> AProfile3 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface3 )
proc Forum3 = ( try_read_a_message -> success -> AMessage3 )
[] ( users -> UserProfiles3 )
[] ( try_post_a_message -> success -> Forum3 )
[] ( home -> Home3 )
[] ( logout -> Interface3 )
[] ( short_delay -> Forum3 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface3 )
proc AMessage3 = ( try_read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile3 )
[] ( back_to_forum -> Forum3 )
[] ( try_reply -> success -> AMessage3 )
[] ( logout -> Interface3 )
[] ( short_delay -> AMessage3 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface3 )
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In every state, apart from the initial Interface3 state, we have inserted a choice
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface3 )
which implements a timeout occuring only after some time (long_delay), which is
long enough not to disrupt the short idling periods that users normally have during
sessions, and a choice
[] ( short_delay -> ... )
which implements such a short idling period.
In general, this safeguard does not fully solve the problem of unauthorised ac-
cesses. In fact, an unauthorised user can still enter an unattended session before
the timeout expires. Let us consider the composite system deﬁned as follows.
proc SYSTEM3 = ( ( Priviliges [| {enter, try_read_a_profile, try_read_a_message,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, try_contact, try_setup, success, logout} |] Interface3)
[| {login, try_setup, try_read_a_message, try_read_a_profile, try_contact,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, logout, short_delay, long_delay, success, failure} |] User)
proc SYSTEM3N = ( SYSTEM3 [| {goal, home, users, forum, back_to_users, back_to_forum,
goal_achieved, leave, logout} |] NonExpert )
We can actually verify using the CWB–NC that security does not hold for the
SYSTEM3N system. However, we can assume that
(6) no authorised user may enter an unattended session within a time period
shorter (short_delay) than the delay (long_delay) that triggers the time-
out.
Such an assumption may be modelled as follows.
proc QuickTimeOut = ( home -> QuickTimeOut )
[] ( users -> QuickTimeOut )
[] ( forum -> QuickTimeOut )
[] ( back_to_users -> QuickTimeOut )
[] ( back_to_forum -> QuickTimeOut )
[] ( logout -> QuickTimeOut )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> QuickTimeOut )
The process that incorporates this assumption is deﬁned as follows.
proc SYSTEM3NQ = ( SYSTEM3N [| {home, users, forum, back_to_users, back_to_forum,
timeout, logout, short_delay, long_delay} |] QuickTimeOut )
We can verify that security holds for the SYSTEM3NQ system.
5.6 Introducing authentication
All safeguards introduced in previous sections contribute to reduce the likelihood of
security violations, but they do not guarantee the absence of such violations. Those
safeguards aim actually to reduce the likelihood that an unauthorised user enters
an unattended open session, but there are no explicit mechanisms in the system to
prevent an unauthorised user, who has actually entered the session, from performing
interactions with the system.
We could modify the web interface by introducing a protection mechanism that
requires the user to provide authentication (i.e., to input a password) before per-
forming a speciﬁc critical action. For example, we would like to avoid masquerading
threats by requiring authentication to users who wish to contact other users.
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We modify the interface as follows.
proc Interface4 = ( enter -> Home4 )
proc Home4 = ( users -> UserProfiles4 )
[] ( forum -> Forum4 )
[] ( try_setup ->
( ( authenticated -> setup -> success -> Home4 )
[] ( failure -> Home4 ) ) )
[] ( logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( short_delay -> Home4 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( failure -> Home4 )
proc UserProfiles4 = ( forum -> Forum4 )
[] ( try_read_a_profile -> read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile4 )
[] ( home -> Home4 )
[] ( logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( short_delay -> UserProfiles4 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( failure -> UserProfiles4 )
proc AProfile4 = ( back_to_users -> UserProfiles4 )
[] ( try_read_a_message -> read_a_message -> success -> AMessage4 )
[] ( try_contact ->
( ( authenticated -> contact -> success -> AProfile4 )
[] ( failure -> AProfile4 ) ) )
[] ( logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( short_delay -> AProfile4 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( failure -> AProfile4 )
proc Forum4 = ( try_read_a_message -> read_a_message -> success -> AMessage4 )
[] ( users -> UserProfiles4 )
[] ( try_post_a_message ->
( ( authenticated -> post_a_message -> success -> Forum4 )
[] ( failure -> Forum4 ) ) )
[] ( home -> Home4 )
[] ( logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( short_delay -> Forum4 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( failure -> Forum4 )
proc AMessage4 = ( try_read_a_profile -> read_a_profile -> success -> AProfile4 )
[] ( back_to_forum -> Forum4 )
[] ( try_reply ->
( ( authenticated -> reply -> success -> AMessage4 )
[] ( failure -> AMessage4 ) ) )
[] ( logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( short_delay -> AMessage4 )
[] ( long_delay -> timeout -> logout -> Interface4 )
[] ( failure -> AMessage4 )
We have now introduced new actions to characterise the success of the user
in performing each speciﬁc “try” action. For example, the success in performing
try_contact is characterised by action contact. Setting up a proﬁle, replying
to or posting a message and contacting another user are now allowed only upon
successful authentication. For example action contact may occur only after action
authenticated. If action failure occurs instead (the authentication fails), then
action contact cannot occur (no contact can be established).
We assume that
(7) only authorised users can be authenticated.
This is a reasonable assumption, which in password-based authentication corre-
sponds to the assumption that the password is kept secret. Assumption (7) may be
deﬁned by a constraint as follows.
proc Authorised = ( authenticated -> Authorised )
[] ( logout -> Authorised )
[] ( unattended -> UnAuthorised )
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proc UnAuthorised = ( failure -> UnAuthorised )
[] ( logout -> Authorised )
This process models the presence of an authorised user until action unattended
occurs, and then the presence of an unauthorised user, with no authenticated
action allowed, until action logout occurs. Note that this constraint restricts as-
sumption (5) in Section 4.3 to authorised users only.
The processes that deﬁne the composite system are deﬁned as follows.
proc SYSTEM4 = ( (Priviliges [| {enter, try_read_a_profile, try_read_a_message,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, try_contact, try_setup, success, logout} |] Interface4)
[| {login, try_setup, try_read_a_message, try_read_a_profile, try_contact,
try_post_a_message, try_reply, logout, short_delay, long_delay, success, failure} |] User)
proc SYSTEM4A = ( SYSTEM4 [| {failure, authenticated, unattended, logout} |] Authorised )
We want to prove that if an open session is left unattended (action unattended),
then a proﬁle cannot be set up (action setup), no contact is established (action
contact), no message is posted (action post_a_message), no reply is sent (action
reply), until at some time during the unattended session a logout (action logout)
occurs. Such a property can be formalised as follows.
prop never_masquerading = A G ( {unattended} ->
( ( {-setup,contact,post_a_message,reply} ) W {logout} ) )
We can verify that prop never_masquerading holds for the SYSTEM4A system
but does not on hold for SYSTEM4.
The web interface might be modiﬁed in a similar way to obtain a system pro-
tected from conﬁdentiality threats. In this case the request for authentication would
be associated with actions read_a_profile and read_a_message and the property
to be veriﬁed would be
prop confidentiality = A G ( {unattended} ->
( ( {-read_a_profile,read_a_message} ) W {logout} ) )
Finally, the web interface could be modiﬁed to protect from both conﬁdentiality
violation and masquerading. Although these mechanisms guarantee perfect security
under assumption (7), it is unlikely that they would all be implemented in a real
system similar to the case study we have analysed. However, if it is likely that some
sensitive information may be posted on the website, privacy policies might require
conﬁdentiality just for that particular information. Then the solution above would
guarantee that no unauthorised user can read conﬁdential proﬁles or messages of
other users. Although masquerading is still possible and some users might be driven
by the attacker to post conﬁdential information, such information could not be read
by the attacker.
6 Conclusion
We have used modelling techniques developed in previous work [2] to separately
model the user goals and web interface components of an interactive tool for com-
munication, information exchange and interest matching [7].
The composition step has been carried out using the constraint-based modelling
style [13,3], in which the behavior of a process is restricted by composing it with a
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special process that works as a contraint. This approach has been exploited to model
alternative aspects of the behaviour of non-expert users (processes NonExpert,
NonForgetful) as well as assumptions that are needed to set the contexts in which
security properties can be expressed (processes QuickTimeOut, Authorised).
Analysis has been carried out by specifying properties in temporal logic and
using several iterations of model-checking to discover security vulnerabilities of the
initial design and verify the correctness of the safeguards introduced.
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